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CASE NOTES

The joint debt which Aaron and Ada Keil incurred was $8,000. Assuming the property to be worth $20,000 each had an equity of $12,000, since
as tenants by the entirety they were both seised of the whole. To allow
contribution of $4,000 to Ada Keil would give her an equiy of $16,000. If
she were to pay the whole debt her equity would remain $12,000. Thus
when her husband died Ada Keil suffered no detriment. In addition the
$8,000 was used for improvements to the land of which she is now sole
owner. It therefore seems inequitable for the estate of a deceased tenant by
the entireties. 9
9 Tenancy by the entirety is not a recognized type of property holding in Illinois.
See Douds v. Fresen, 392 Il. 478, 64 N.E.2d 729 (1946); Lawler v. Byrne, 252 111.194, 96
N.E. 892 (1911). Non-recognition of tenancy in the Married Woman's Act of 1861,
Laws 1861, p. 143.

TAXATION-UNION STRIKE BENEFITS HELD NOT TO
CONSTITUTE INCOME UNDER INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE
Plaintiff brought suit to recover taxes imposed by the Commissioner
upon strike benefits received from the United Automobile Workers during the early stages of the now famous Kohler strike. At the trial,' the presiding judge reserved ruling on the Commissioner's motion for a directed
verdict and submitted the case to the jury for a determination of whether
the payments in question constituted a gift. The jury returned a verdict in
favor of the taxpayer on this issue, whereupon the judge set aside the verdict and granted the Commissioner's motion for a directed verdict. On
appeal, the court of appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that
strike benefits do not constitute income within the meaning of the Internal
Revenue Code. 2 In addition, the court held that the particular receipts involved in this case were gifts and, therefore, expressly exempted from taxation by Section 102 of the Code.3 Kaiser v. United States, 267 F.2d 367
(C.A. 7th, 1958).
One of the most perplexing problems in the interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code, taxability of strike benefits, is presented by the instant
case. This decision raises serious questions of law and policy which doubtless will not be put to final rest unless and until the Supreme Court takes
the case.
1The proceedings in the district court are reported in Kaiser v. United States, 158
F. Supp. 865 (E.D. Wis., 1958).
2The definition of gross income set forth in Section 61(a) is pivotal to all the income tax provisions in the Code. Only those receipts which are encompassed within this
definition are subject to taxation.
3
Section 102 (a) provides: "Gross income does not include the value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance."
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At the outset, it seems necessary to point out that the Kaiser case does
not present the issue of taxability of strike benefits in its clearest form. The
taxpayer in this case was not a member of the UAW at the time the strike
commenced. A part of the strike benefits in issue were received under a
plan whereby the UAW made these benefits available to non-members.
Subsequently, Kaiser joined the union and a part of the benefits were
received thereafter. At no time during the period in question, however,
4
did the taxpayer pay dues to the union.
In concluding that strike benefits do not constitute income within the
meaning of §61 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code, the court relied heavily
upon a series of rulings by the Commissioner whereby analogous receipts
had been held non-taxable. Reference was made to the non-taxable status
of damages for alienation of affections; 5 damages for breach of promise to
marry;0 awards under wrongful death statutes; 7 payments to war prisoners for mistreatment by their captors;8 retirement benefits paid under the
Federal Old Age and Survivors Insurance System;" unemployment compensation benefits paid by a state;' 0 public assistance relief payments;"
subsistence given a disaster victim by the American Red Cross; 12 and, rehabilitation payments made to victims of a tornado disaster from a special
fund set up by a large employer in the area for the benefit of his employees and their families. 13 Without any express explanation of the
theory upon which these rulings were being related to the problem at
hand, the court proceeded to the conclusion that strike benefits were similarly non-taxable because they were distributed on the basis of need.
An analysis of these rulings would seem to permit a fairly accurate reconstruction of the court's underlying theory. First, it seems clear that the
first four rulings were cited merely to indicate the susceptibility of Section
61 (a) to a limiting interpretation. These rulings seem to have little relation
factually to the treatment to be accorded strike benefits. The remainder
of the rulings may be treated collectively as authority for the proposition
that payments received on the basis of need are non-taxable.
Although the tax-exempt status of unemployment compensation has
long been established, 14 the Commissioner has not seen fit to extend this
4 The strike was called on April 5, 1954. Taxpayer began to receive strike benefits on
May 4, 1954. On August 19, 1954, he became a member of the UAW.
5 I.T. 1804,11-2 Cum. Bull. 61 (1923).
6 G.C.M. 4363, VII-2 Cum. Bull. 185 (1928).

7See 1.T. 2420, VII-2 Cum. Bull. 123 (1928).
10 I.T. 3230, 1938-2 Cum. Bull. 136.
11 Rev. Rul. 57-102, 1957-1 Cum. Bull. 26.
9 I.T. 3447, 1941-1 Cum. Bull. 191.
12 Spec. Rul. of I.R.S., 5 Stan. Fed. Tax. Rep. §6196.
13 Rev. Rul. 131, 1953-2 Cum. Bull. 112.
8 Rev. Rul. 55-132, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 213.

14 The ruling referred to in note 11 was made in 1938.
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exemption to strike benefits. This, despite the fact that the very reason
unions maintain such programs is that unemployment compensation is not
generally available to strikers. 15 Several arguments have been urged to
justify this disparate treatment. 6
First, it has been suggested that the distinction rests upon the fact that
one system (unemployment compensation) is administered by the government whereas the other is private. It is difficult to perceive the relevance
of this distinction in relation to the provisions of the Code. When viewed
in the light of the Commissioner's recognition of the tax-exempt status of
the employer-administered rehabilitation payments, it becomes incomprehensible.
Another ground for the distinction which has been suggested is the fact
that unemployment compensation is provided only for workers whose
unemployment is involuntary, whereas, strike benefits go to those who
choose not to work. Here, again, there is difficulty in relating this difference to the Code provisions. And the tax-exempt status of public assistance
relief payments would seem to indicate that such a distinction is unwarranted. Moreover, the fact that unemployment compensation is available
in a few states to strikers indicates that the voluntariness issue is not criti17
cal.
The final argument upon which the distinction between unemployment
compensation and strike benefits is supposed to rest is that the union member has already been allowed a deduction for the payment of his dues from
which payments the union strike fund is generated. To allow recipients of
strike benefits to exclude them from gross income is thus said to create a
"double-deduction" problem. On its face this argument seems to have considerable validity. An examination of the facts, however, reveals its fatal
weakness. Deductions for payment of union dues are taken "below the
line," i.e., they cannot be taken if the taxpayer avails himself of the standard deduction.' s In view of the fact that the vast majority of workers use
the standard deduction, the "double-deduction" problem would seem to
15 "In only two states and only after an extensive waiting period are striking workers
eligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits, although other workers
forced out of work as a result of the strike, may be eligible under certain circumstances."

AFL-CIO Collective Bargaining Report, Vol. III, No. 11, November, 1958.
16 For a summary of these arguments, see 19 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 824 (1958).
17The fact that unemployment compensation is sometimes available to strikers creates the possibility of disparate treatment occasioned by a variance in state law. For example, if state A allows such compensation, a worker therein receives subsistence free
from taxation. At the same time, a worker in state B, where unemployment compensa-

tion is unavailable and reliance upon union support therefore necessary, would be
taxed on his subsistence under the Commissioner's view. Such a result must be regarded
as questionable at best.
18 See Section 62 of the Internal Revenue Code.
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be more apparent than real. Moreover, the tax-exempt status of disaster
benefits administered by the Red Cross may provide an example where
the Commissioner has allowed a double deduction. If, for example, the recipient of such benefits claimed a charitable deduction for a contribution
previously made to the Red Cross, his position would be identical to that
of the dues-paying union member who subsequently receives strike benefits. Despite this obvious analogy, the Commissioner has insisted that disparate treatment is warranted.
The foregoing would seem to indicate that the court of appeals was
correct in holding strike benefits not to constitute income within the
meaning of Section 61(a). Though the rulings upon which it rested its
decision have never received judicial sanction, 19 a sound policy of tax
administration would seem to demand consistency in the application of
the law. The decision here guarantees such consistency.
The court of appeals found, in the Kaiser case, that the strike benefits
to Kaiser were intended as a gift. The court had to deal with facts that
would both buttress and weaken the presence of donative intent. On the
one hand, (a) the verdict of the jury that there was a gift, (b) the status
of the taxpayer vis-a-vis the union, and (c) the past practice of the union
to use its strike fund for charitable purposes 20 constitute facts which tend
to warrant the inference of a donative intent on the part of the union. On
the other hand, (a) the commercial context in which the payments were
made, (b) the fact that the Union Constitution forbade the use of the
strike fund for purposes other than the aiding of local unions during
strikes and lockouts,2 ' and (c) the fact that recipients of strike benefits
generally regarded themselves as bound to perform certain duties in return
therefor 22 would seem to lead to an opposite result. An evaluation of each
of these factors would appear to be a necessary prerequisite to the construction of a framework within which the problem can be solved.
The weight to be accorded to the jury's determination that the benefits
conferred upon Kaiser by the Union constituted a gift presents a difficult
problem. If findings by a jury in suits in the district courts are accorded
the same status as findings by the Tax Court, an altogether quite reasonable
assumption, the Supreme Court decision in Bogardus v. Commissioner2
would seem to be in point. There, the Court reversed a judgment predicated upon a finding by the Tax Court that the transfer involved was made
19 This is, of course, due to the fact that there is no one to complain of leniency
on the part of the Commissioner.
20 See Kaiser v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 865, 868 (E.D. Wis., 1958).
21 Ibid., at 867 where the court discusses Article 16, Section 11 of the International
Union Constitution.
28 302 U.S. 34 (1937).
22 Authority cited note 20, supra.
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without a donative intent on the grounds that the circumstances surrounding the transfer "clearly indicated" that the Tax Court's finding was
erroneous. In view of the vigorous dissent in the case 2 4 the question cannot be regarded as entirely settled.
Assuming, however, that this aspect of the Bogardus case retains its
vitality, it would seem to constitute a precedent clearly sufficient to justify
a review of the jury's finding in the Kaiser case. For, in Kaiser, as in
Bogardus, no conflict in testimony is involved. Rather, the finding is no
more than an inference from stipulated facts and uncontroverted testimony. Its validity would seem, therefore, to depend solely upon a proper
evaluation of the surrounding circumstances and not at all upon a determination as to the credibility of particular witnesses. Where such findings
are involved, it seems quite proper that the appellate courts exercise their
powers of review and not consider themselves bound by jury determinations at the trial.
Thus, under the Bogardus rule, the finding of the jury in the Kaiser case
could stand only if it was not clearly erroneous when considered in the
light of the attendant circumstances. For reasons to be developed below, it
is submitted that the finding could not be set aside as clearly erroneous.
Rather, it would appear that the circumstantial context in which Kaiser
received strike benefits from the Union were so wholly ambiguous that
the jury would have been warranted in finding either way.
The fact that the taxpayer in the Kaiser case was not a member of the
union during a part of the period in question and, during no part of that
period, paid dues to the union would appear to be of substantial significance. Whatever the legal or moral obligation of the union toward its
dues-paying members, it seems clear that no obligation of any kind was
owing to Kaiser. Thus, in this respect at least, there is no inconsistency
with the finding of a donative intent.
The prior history of use of the Union strike fund for charitable
purposes would seem to have a twofold significance. First, it indicates that
the predominantly commercial purpose of the Union is not completely inconsistent with a charitable intent on its part. Secondly, it militates against
an overly strong reliance upon the limitations in the Union Constitution
on the use of the strike fund. Thus, two of the factors mentioned above as
tending to negative the existence of a donative intent are not so weighty as
they may on the surface appear.
Nevertheless, it would not seem justified to discount either of these factors completely. The recent Supreme Court decision in Commissioner v.
Jacobson2 5 all but overruling an earlier decision in Helvering v. American
24The dissenters were Cardozo, Brandeis, Stone, and Black.
25336 U.S. 28 (1949).
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Dental Co.,2 6 is indicative of an increasing reluctance on the part of the
courts to infer the presence of a gift in a commercial situation. Similarly,
a cautious attitude can be expected from the courts when they are asked
to infer a motive which would be ultra vires. Given the currently prevailing climate of opinion, this would seem particularly true where the ultra
vires act would constitute a misappropriation of union funds.
One factor remains to be discussed, i.e., the obligations which the recipient of strike benefits incurred. There was testimony at the trial that the
recipient of strike benefits considered himself morally obligated to aid the
union in the conduct of the strike by picketing, serving in a soup kitchen,
or similar duties. It is clear that if the union conferred these benefits in
order to induce such activities, they were not gifts but merely compensation for services within the rule of Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner.27 But the uncontroverted testimony seems to indicate that this was not
the case. Rather, the Union seems to have conferred strike benefits upon
only one criterion-the needs of the various strikers. It is possible then that
the moral obligation felt by the recipients was no more than the normal
feeling of gratitude which donees have toward donors. If this be the case,
the fact that their gratitude found voluntary expression in activity beneficial to the Union is not inconsistent with the existence of a gift.
The foregoing discussion indicates the complexity of this question, a
complexity which was well camouflaged by both the majority opinion
and the dissent in the court of appeals. It seems fair to say that under the
circumstances of the case, either inference (presence or lack of donative
intent) would appear defensible. In such a situation, the normal solution
is to uphold the decision reached by the body charged with the primary
determination of the facts. For reasons to be developed below, this solution is not feasible in the Kaiser case.
The Kaiser case was set up as a test case from the very beginning. Literally thousands of taxpayers similarly situated were awaiting the outcome
of the case in order to accurately determine their own tax liabilities. Under
such circumstances, it would seem imperative that some decision which
does not involve a case by case adjudication be made. The reliance upon a
jury to determine the donative intent of the taxpayer inevitably involves
this impractical method of adjudication. The trial judge's decision to set
aside the jury determination and direct a verdict in favor of the Tax Commissioner was doubtless prompted by considerations of a practical judicial
administration of the problem of strike benefits. It has already been shown
that such a directed verdict as a matter of law is not justified by the facts.
26 318 U.S. 322 (1943). Both this and the Jacobson case involve the taxability of cancellation of indebtedness income.
27 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
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The court of appeals' primary reliance upon the definition of gross
income contained in Section 61(a) was doubtless premised upon these
same considerations of judicial administration. For reasons set forth above,
it is felt that the solution of the problem chosen by the court of appeals is
superior to that of the district court.
Final decision of this case may well be yet to come. The case is of sufficient importance to merit consideration by the Supreme Court. The desirable conclusion would, of course, be the enactment of clarifying legislation by Congress. As usual, however, the possibility of such legislation in
the foreseeable future is dim.

